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Regulation as a policy contest: the probability of conservation  
of a renewable resource  
Abstract 
How do the levels of extreme positions of various interest groups influence the conservation policies in the context of a 
renewable resource conservation contest? To answer this question, a model is provided where conservation policy is 
determined as a contest between two opposing interest groups: one in favor of conservation and another in favor of 
non-conservation. The levels of extreme positions for the conservationalists are determined by their demands about the 
severity of the conservation strategy that needs to be implemented. For the non-conservation group, the level of 
extreme position is determined by how large the current harvest of the resource should be.  
The main driver of the model is that resource conservation is realized only if the conservation group wins the contest, 
which again depends on the relative gain the two contenders receive when winning the contest. The paper derives 
conditions where the more extreme positioned groups will have less likelihood of succeeding, e.g., a conservation 
group demanding larger conservation efforts will face a reduced probability that actual conservation policies will be 
implemented. 
Keywords: political contest, probability of conservation, resource management, environmental degradation, extreme 
positions. 
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Introduction 1 
In recent years, the idea that natural resources (e.g., 
the seas of Europe) should be brought back to a state 
of “good environmental (or ecological) status” has 
influenced regulation
1.2 However, conservation will 
likely happen at the expense of the (short run) 
interests of the harvester of the resource. At times, 
the conservation groups even argued for a full stop 
of harvest for a number of years, e.g., WWF (2006). 
Harvesters of the resource who are concerned about 
the short-run profitability will have incentives to try 
to affect policy by lobbying against cut-backs in the 
allowable harvest
2.3  
Against this background, the forthcoming politically 
determined harvest level is modelled as a political 
contest between the harvesters, on the one hand, and 
the conservationalists, on the other hand.  
 Urs Steiner Brandt, 2017. 
Urs Steiner Brandt, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of 
Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics, University of 
Southern Denmark, Campus Esbjerg, Denmark. 
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International 
license, which permits re-use, distribution, and reproduction, provided 
the materials aren’t used for commercial purposes and the original work 
is properly cited. 
1 As an example, the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) 
came into force in 2008. Essentially the target is to reach good 
environmental status (GEnS) in 2020 in all EU member states (EU, 
2005; Juda, 2010; Long, 2011). 
2 See Brandt and Svendsen (2016) for an overview over lobby activity 
in the EU and its economic, social and environmental consequence. 
For a more general presentation of political economy applied to 
environmental issues see Hovi et al. (2011). 
The harvesters opt for a larger harvest, the 
conservation group, interested in establishing 
good environmental/ecological status, opt for a 
larger stock by demanding a smaller current 
harvest. Without any lobbying, the policy makers 
will make a balanced policy. In this type 
of model, the probability that a specific 
outcome will be chosen depends on the relative 
gains the two groups receive from winning the 
contest. 
Both groups can be more or less extreme 
regarding their demands. The conservation group 
is called more extreme if it demands a larger stock 
and, hence, less harvests, while the harvest group 
is more extreme when demanding larger harvest 
resulting in a lower future stock.  
The research questions of this paper are as 
follows: under what conditions will a more 
extreme positioned conservation group will make 
it more likely that the resource will actually be 
protected. Furthermore, if the resource is under 
pressure due to worsened environmental 
conditions, how will this affect the probability 
that the resource is conserved? And how does this 
relate to the extreme position of the interest 
groups? And finally it also addresses the question 
of how the probability of conservation is affected 
when the political agenda shift in favor of 
one group.  
Political contest models have been applied to 
analyze contests between competing interest groups 
(Nitzan, 1994), coordination efforts by interest 
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groups sharing the same objective of influencing the 
provision of a specific public good (Dijkstra, 1998), 
and the interaction between an interest group and a 
two-tier government in which the interest group 
tries to influence politicians to reject or accept 
proposals made by agenda-setting bureaucrats (Epstein 
& Nitzan, 2002). The specification of the model in the 
current paper resembles that of Epstein and Nitzan 
(2002), in which two interest groups compete over the 
provision of a public good that is beneficial to one 
group and costly to the other group.  
Several papers use the same type of political contest 
model as the current paper’s model in an 
environmental and conservation context. In 
Graichen et al. (2001), a political contest is 
modelled between a local environmental group and 
a monopoly over a local energy system. As in our 
model, the probability of winning the contest 
depends on the relative gain (utility vs. profit) from 
winning the contest. One finding of their analysis is 
that when the monopoly is threatened by an 
environmental pressure group, then it is optimal for 
the monopoly to reduce emission, thereby 
increasing the probability of wining the implicit 
contest. Also Liston-Heyes (2001) analyzes a 
contest between a developer wishing to undertake a 
project and an environmental group that opposes 
planning consent. Liston-Heyes (2001) makes 
policy proposals endogenous in the sense that the 
contenders take into account that their proposals 
also affect the preferred position of the other 
contenders. Their result is that treating the policy 
proposals endogenously implies less aggressive 
action from the contesters. The current paper does 
treat the proposals of the contender exogenous, but 
instead considers how policy is affected by the 
various positions that the contender could hold.  
The current paper assumes a unified decision 
makers and that there exists full information. Two 
papers have analyzed the contest model where these 
assumptions are challenged. Epstein et al. (2007) 
and Epstein et al. (2008) include incomplete 
information in the contest model, where the 
contesters do not know where the centre of powers 
lays leading to less distortion in the political 
process. Also a two-sided contest is considered by 
Epstein et al. (2008), where the contenders both use 
lobby effort not only in the ordinary policy contest, 
but also in a contest about supporting the various 
source of power (bureaucrats and/or politicians).   
This current paper adds to another feature too this 
stand of the literature by considering how the 
probability of winning the context depends on 
“extreme” position of the two contending groups. It 
also adds to the analysis of how changes in 
environmental conditions affect these results. The 
paper that comes closest to this papers analysis is 
the paper by Eerola (2004) who analyzes a lobby 
contest about forest conservation between an 
environmental lobby group and a lobby group 
representing an industrial wood producer. Here the 
policy outcome is forest conservation, and the 
relatively most efficient lobby group has the largest 
probability of winning the contest. Instead of 
efficiency in lobbying, in our model, the relative 
gain from winning the contest determines the 
probability of winning the contest3.
4 
A novelty of the analysis of this paper is how the 
two groups preferred policy outcome affects the 
probability of conservation. The point of departure 
with respect to the behavior of the harvesters is the 
assumption that the harvesters are organized in one 
lobby group with the objective of maximizing a 
weighted sum of current profit and total 
intertemporal profit for the group as a whole. Such a 
preferred policy proposal of the harvesters is too 
high compared to one that maximizes the 
intertemporal profit
4.5   A question that naturally 
arises here is why the harvester’s organization 
prefers a policy that does not fully directly 
maximize intertemporal profit. One obvious reason 
is that the harvester’s organization does not have 
sufficient discretion over the individual harvester. A 
well-established fact in the literature on fisheries is 
that individual fisheries are either in a common pool 
or an open access situation, both of which give the 
individual fishermen incentive to maximize their 
short run profit, which again implies that they will 
not consider the future profitability of the 
industry
5.6Olson (1965) states that the 
3 In some case, there might be an alignment between harvester and 
conservation issues and then no real contest emerges. In Brandt and 
Svendsen (2009), this result emerges when the fishermen receive high 
subsidies when performing bad and incentives exists that interests between 
fishermen and environmentalists are aligned. 
4 It should be noted that many papers find that regulation is not effective in 
achieving sustainable harvesting levels, in particular in fisheries. According 
to Pitcher (2001), the ecosystem is constantly eroded, partly due to the fact 
that fishing efforts act as a selection mechanism favoring short lived, fast 
growing fish (Pauly, 1995) and partly due to a series of political and 
economic imperatives that drives the system in a downward spiral (Ludwig 
et al., 1993). The main lesson from these observations is that that there is an 
inherent incentive structure which implies overfishing regardless of 
regulation, aside from a total closure of the industry.
5 Wilen (2000) nicely describes the development of economic theory into 
fishery regulations, pointing out that the most promising approaches recently 
have been the introduction of individually transferable quotas (ITQs). 
Although ITQs can solve many of the problems in fisheries with respect to 
overcapitalization (problems such as insufficient effort per boat and too 
many harvesters) and therefore tend to increase the profitability of the 
industry, it will not necessarily in itself solve the problem of overfishing 
resulting from political pressure to set the number of issued quotas too 
high, although higher quotas implies lower quota prices. 
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commonality of the goals of an interest group’s 
members makes the achievement of these goals a 
public good for the group, which thus gives rise to 
the same incentives to free-riding in all public 
good and prisoners’ dilemma situations6.7 
The second group that has the power to influence 
the decision of how to manage the renewable 
resource is an environmental group with the aim 
of conservation of the resource7.8More specifically, 
its agenda is to increase the stock size of the 
resource to an “acceptable” level. When the 
conservationists win the contest, the adopted 
policy is one of conserving the resource. We vary 
the objective of the environmentalists groups from 
choosing a policy that secures maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY, which is the weakest 
requirement) to preferring a stock close to its 
natural equilibrium (implying very small or none 
harvesting pressure).  
The more extreme positions of the 
environmentalists can be motivated by a desire of 
safeguarding the stocks in case of unforeseen 
(stochastic) temporary shocks that could force the 
stock below its minimum level with long lasting 
adverse consequences8.9 The objective of these 
types of conservationalists is, therefore, to secure 
the stock of the renewable resource by 
temporarily closing the harvesting activity9.10 
The result of the contest depends on the relative 
gain that the two interest groups receive from 
winning the contest (compared to loosing). When, 
for example, the net gain for the harvesters from 
winning increases (while it remains constant for the 
                                                     
6 Two important conclusions can be drawn from this observation: (1) it 
is easier to form an interest group when the number of potential 
members is smaller than when the number is larger; and (2) thus, the 
establishment of an organization that effectively represents large 
numbers of individuals requires that “separate and ‘selective’ 
incentives” be used to curb free-riding behavior. 
7 We treat the conservation group as one monolith group. In reality the 
conservation and environmental side is covered by many special interest 
groups and/or NGOs. Richards and Heard (2005) give a description of 
various NGOs involved in the implementation process of the EU marine 
policy. 
8 As an example of the objectives of the conservationalists in a fisheries 
context: the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) 
has been calling for a complete ban on cod fishing in the North Sea, 
Irish Sea and west of Scotland, in order to prevent cod stocks from 
going the way of the Canadian cod stocks which collapsed in the early 
1990s, see ICES (2005). 
9 Brandt and Svendsen (2009) analyze this in a strategic context: if the 
regulator is uncertain of the true stock, then situations exist in which 
conservationalists prefer overfishing in the short run, since with 
declining stocks (and eventually declining catches) the biologists might 
find it easier to convince the regulator to stop the fisheries. This scheme 
works best in the presence of subsidies.  
conservationalists), then the harvesters will invest 
more in winning the contest, and as a consequence, 
the probability that they will win increases. This 
result is then linked to the positions that the two 
groups hold. The general result here is that if a 
group hold a more extreme position, the probability 
that the resource will be conserved will increase 
only if the that group receives a larger percentage 
increase in the net benefit from winning the contest 
than does the opposing group.  
This paper also analyzes how changed 
environmental conditions influence the relative 
benefits for the two competing interest groups through 
its effect on biological background variables, and 
consequently, how the probability of conservation is 
linked to such changes10.11Changed environmental 
conditions are likely to affect the two interest groups’ 
gain differently. One striking result is that when 
environmental conditions worsen, this negatively 
affects the probability that the resource is conserved, 
under the condition that the percentage net benefit 
from winning increases more for the harvesters than 
for the conservationalists. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section 
analyzes the behavior of the harvesters and the 
conservationalists and the possible development in 
stock and harvest, while section 2 states the political 
contest model. Given this set-up, section 3 provides 
the analysis of how various factors of the model 
influences the probability of conservation. In 
particular, the effect of the relative position of the 
group on policy output, and effect of worsening of 
environmental conditions and cost asymmetries.  
1. The harvesting/conservation model 
Let us consider a renewable resource that is 
harvested. The stock is denoted ܵ and the harvest ݄. 
The exact harvest level is politically determined. 
Without any lobbying, the harvest level is 
determined by scientific parameters like 
development in stock, technology, etc. However, in 
this paper, the political contest model is taken to its 
extreme, in that the winners’ preferred outcome will 
be fully implemented. Therefore, the chosen harvest 
level is fully affected by lobbying effort by two 
opposing lobby groups: group representing the 
                                                     
10 The paper also addresses the analyses of the effects of changed 
environmental conditions on the policy outcome. One major possibility 
of such changed environmental conditions is climate change. The fifth 
report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014) 
estimates an increase in the global mean temperature in the range of 0.3-
4.8 degrees by end of the century. This is very likely to affect the future 
profitability of most renewable resources, like fisheries and forestry. 
With respect to fisheries, climate change is expected to influence the 
recruitment, size and quality of the fish resource, changes in migration 
of species, or even changes in transportation of larvae. See, e.g., Buck et 
al. (2004). 
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harvesters and a group representing the 
conservationalists. Two groups enter a political 
contest to determine the harvest/stock size of the 
renewable resource. Each group has a preferred 
position/policy proposal. The harvesters interested in a 
preferred harvest level and the conservationalists are 
interested in a preferred stock size. 
First, we set-up the basic model by considering the 
optimal policies for the two groups and thereafter a 
political contest is applied to determine the expected 
outcome of this political process.  
The model uses the following assumptions1112: 
A1: The chosen policy will prevail. 
A2: The agreed upon harvest rule is a rule that 
specifies a path that the harvest must take over time. 
A3: If the conservation group wins the contest, ܵ 
increases and ݄ decreases in the periods to come and 
if the harvesting group wins the contest ݄ increases 
and ܵ decreases over time. 
A4: Each group has its preferred harvest level (e.g., 
harvest level per year). 
Regarding A1, once the policy is chosen, no further 
possibilities for influencing the harvest are given by 
any parties. We can justify this considering the 
policy as being a determination of a long-run trend. 
A2 defines an implicit dynamics that is not 
explicitly modelled. ݄ is the harvesting rule to 
follow over a non-specified period of time. By ܵ we 
denote the resulting stock given the chosen policy. 
As with the harvest, ܵ can be interpreted as a path 
that the stock will follow over the same time span as 
the harvesting rule. 
By A3 it is assumed that if the conservation group 
wins the contest, then the stock will increase and the 
harvest will decrease in the periods to come. The 
more demanding the conservation group regarding 
the requirement on the stock, the smaller will the 
harvest be12. 13 
In a parallel fashion, if the harvesting group wins 
the contest, then the harvest will increase, and the 
stock will decrease in the periods to come. The more 
demanding the harvesting group regarding the 
requirement on the harvest, the smaller will the 
stock be over time. However, there is a possibility 
that a large temporary increase in harvest and 
                                                     
11 These assumptions will be discussed further in the conclusion. 
12 We disregard the possibility of a large temporary reduction in harvest 
and thereby increase in stock over time might result in an increase of the 
harvest in later periods. 
thereby decrease in stock over time could result in 
lower feasible harvests in later periods. 
Once we have defined the position that the two 
contenders can hold, we show an example of the 
path that the stock and the harvest can follow. 
Assumption A4 is described in detail in the next 
section, where the preferred harvest level of the two 
groups is derived. 
1.1. The harvesters’ preferred outcome. Let us 
define ࢎ ൌ ࢎࡹࡱࢅ as the harvest level that 
maximizes the intertemporal profit for the 
harvesting group. The resulting profit is denoted ૈ܂, 
being the maximum NPV of current and all future 
profit from harvesting (for a given discount rate). 
On the other extreme, we define open access as a 
situation where ࣊ࡻ࡭ ൌ ࣊൫ࢎࡻ࡭, ࡿࡻ࡭൯ → ૙. In this 
situation, harvest levels are continuously so high 
that profits approach zero in the long run, but in 
comparison with ܐۻ۳܇, significantly higher profit in 
the short run. Open access implies lobbying for 
large harvest due to a high focus on short-run profit 
at the expense of future profits. We have that ܐ۽ۯ ൐ ܐۻ۳܇, but over time ࣊൫ࢎࡻ࡭൯ ൏ ࣊ሺࢎࡹࡱࢅሻ. 
A well-established fact in the literature is that the 
individual harvester (e.g., individual fisherman) has 
an incentive to maximize his short-run profit and not 
to consider the future profitability of the industry. 
On the other hand, such behavior is not collectively 
rational for the harvester group as a whole. 
However, harvesters are often part of an 
organization that promotes the policies which serve 
the harvesters’ interests, and such an organization 
faces the underlying problem of balancing between 
what is best for the group and best for the 
individual. To capture this incentive problem, we 
introduce a parameter ߙ ∈ ሾͲ,ͳሿ measuring the level 
of the inability of the harvesters’ organization to 
maximize the groups’ profit. If ߙ approaches 1, then 
we are in a situation where the harvesters act in a 
fully open access context. The other extreme is a 
situation with a harvest organizations has full 
discretion over the actions of the harvester, or a sole 
owner (monopolist) operating in the industry, who 
would fully take into account how current 
harvesting affects future profitability implying an ߙ 
approaches 0. 
The position of the group determines its 
preferred harvest level. α ൌ ͳ implies h୓୅ 
accomplished by a high current harvest level and 
a stock that over times is reduced, and profit 
reduced over time approaching 0. α ൌ Ͳ implies h୑୉ଢ଼ accomplished by a moderate harvest level 
and a stock that, depending on the current size of 
the stock, can increase or decrease over time, but 
Environmental Economics, Volume 8, Issue 3, 2017 
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approaches a level well above open access, and 
where the profit over time approaches the 
highest possible defined by the maximum 
sustainable yield.  
It is therefore possible to define the preferred harvest 
level, ݄, as a function of ߙ, and we write ݄ఈ, with ௗ௛ഀௗఈ ൌ ݄ఈఈ ൐ Ͳ.We define ߨ ൌ ߨሺ݄ఈ; ߙሻ as the profit 
function for a group with ߙ, in the understanding that ߨఈ ൐ Ͳfor ݄ ൏ ݄ఈ and ߨఈ ൏ Ͳ for ݄ ൐ ݄ఈ 	13. For a 
given position of the harvester, and resulting ݄ఈ, a 
unique path of S will emerge, denoted by: ܵఈ ൌܵሺ݄ఈሻ. 
The larger ߙ, the less weight is put on future profit and 
therefore the larger a current harvest is opt for in the 
political contest with the conservationalists. Note that ߙ can be interpreted as a measurement of the level of 
“extreme position” of the harvesting group, with ߙ ൌ ͳ being the most extreme in terms of demands on 
current harvests.  
1.2. The conservationalists’ preferred outcome. 
Turning to the conservationalists, this group has solely 
preferences over the “development in the stock”, and 
their target is a harvest policy that brings the stock as 
close as possible to what the group defines as being 
optimal14. 
The conservationalists might, however, vary by the 
preferred stock size. An extreme position will be to re-
establish a natural equilibrium (denoted ܵ஼஼ for the 
stock size at the carrying  capacity), amounting to zero 
or very limited harvest, while others would prefer 
a less extreme approach. The other extreme being 
a stock size of ܵெௌ௒ ൏ ܵ஼஼, which implies a 
permanently high harvest and a considerable less 
stock size15. 
To capture the whole range of possibilities, we 
assume that any conservationalist position 
resulting in stock between ܵ஼஼ and ܵெௌ௒ is 
possible. Define ߚ ∈ ሺͲ,ͳሻ as a measure of the 
degree of extreme position, and define ܵ ൌ	ܵሺߚሻ, where ܵሺߚ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ܵ஼஼ and ܵሺߚ ൌ Ͳሻ ൌܵெௌ௒. ܵఉ is the preferred stock for a given ߚ, such that ఉܵఉ ൐ Ͳ.  Formally, the ܵఉ is derived as follows. 
We assume that the conservationalists have single 
peaked preferences and these preferences are 
represented by a utility function: ݑ஼ ൌ ݑ஼ሺܵ; ߚሻ ݑௌ஼ ൐ Ͳ for ܵ ൏ ܵఉ, ݑௌ஼ ൌ Ͳ  
for ܵ ൌ ܵఉ and ݑௌ஼ ൏ Ͳ for ܵ ൐ ܵఉ. 
Finally, the desired stock translates into a harvest 
policy. Each ܵሺߚሻ results in one harvest rule, call ݄ఉ ൌ ݄ሺܵఉሻ. It follows that ݄ఉఉ ൏ Ͳ. Given the 
way the relationship between harvest and stock is 
specified, it follows that a demand of a higher 
stock implies a lower harvest path. Figure 1 repeats 
the interpretation of ߙ and ߚ. 
 
Fig. 1. The possible positions of the two competing groups1415
16
 
                                                     
13 Notationally, we sometimes use subscripts to denote derivate, like 
ௗ௛ഀௗఈ ൌ ݄ఈఈ and likewise ௗమ௛ഀௗఈௗఈ ൌ ݄ఈఈఈ . 
14 E.g., how large a stock is required in a “good ecological /environmental status” case, e.g., as defined by prescriptors in EU GES (EU, 2008). 
15 We could have chosen other point here, but the ܵெௌ௒, but choice of the two targets reflect two extreme position, one where conservationalists not 
care at all about the harvest opportunities and one where the steady state harvest is maximized.  
݄஼஼ ݄ை஺ ݄ொ௒ ݄ெௌ௒ 
ߚ ߙ Ͳ ͳ ͳ 
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Finally, to give an impression of the dynamics and 
how the contenders’ positions affect the path of the 
stock and the harvest, let us consider that the policy 
determined at time ݐ௢ stretches out until time ݐ் ൐ Ͳ. 
The Figures 2-4 show possible paths for ܵ and ݄ for 
the most extreme position such that any 
intermediate position has a development in between 
the largest and lowest possible position16.
 
Fig. 2. Situation where ࢼ ൌ ૚  
Fig. 3. Situation where ࢼ ൌ ૙ 
 
 
Fig. 4. Situation where ࢻ ൌ ૚  Fig. 5. Situation where ࢻ ൌ ૙ 
 
2. The political contest 
In the political contest, the probability that the 
preferred policy of the conservation group is 
selected is ݌஼ , while the probability of  
selection of the harvester’s preferred policy is ݌ு ൌ ͳ െ ݌஼ .  
In this type of political contest model, it is generally 
assumed that the contenders can affect the probabilities 
by their contribution levels. The existence of a contest 
success function (CSF) is also assumed which 
specifies the probability of approval of the proposed 
policy corresponding to the rent-seeking effort of the 
interest groups (see Epstein & Nitzan, 2002). Let ݔு 
and ݔ஼  be the contribution of the harvester’s group 
and the conservationalists, respectively. A commonly 
used CSF is the constant returns to scale non-
discriminating rule: ݌ு ൌ ݔு/ሺݔு ൅ ݔ஼ሻ and ݌஼ ൌ ݔ஼/ሺݔு ൅ ݔ஼ሻ. The policy proposals of the 
two contenders are exogenous (but dependent on ߙ 
and ߚ, respectively), in the sense that the two groups 
choose their referred action without considering 
how their choice affects the other group’s 
behaviour. 
In order to set up the political contest, we 
introduce expected welfare functions of the two 
contenders: 
ܧሾܹுሺߙ, ߚሻሿ ൌ ܲு ∙ ߨሺ݄ఈ , ߙሻ ൅ ܲ஼ ∙ ߨ൫݄ఉ , ߙ൯ െ ݔு ܧሾܹ஼ሺߙ, ߚሻሿ ൌ ܲ஼ ∙ ݑ൫ܵఉ , ߚ൯ ൅ ܲு ∙ ݑሺܵఈ , ߚሻ െ ݔ஼ 
Let the net benefit from winning the contest for the 
contenders be:   ܰுሺߙ, ߚሻ ൌ ߨሺ݄ఈ , ߙሻ െ ߨሺ݄ఉ , ߙሻ ܰ஼ሺߙ, ߚሻ ൌ ݑ൫ܵఉ , ߚ൯ െ ݑሺܵఈ , ߚሻ 
The net benefit functions are determined by the 
difference in the welfare from winning and losing 
the contest. Therefore, any change that makes the 
welfare from losing smaller will increase the net 
benefit from wining the contest. Inserting these into 
back into the welfare functions yield:  ܧሾܹுሺߙ, ߚሻሿ ൌ ܲு ∙ ܰுሺߙ, ߚሻ ൅ ߨሺ݄ఉ , ߙሻ െ ݔு ܧሾܹ஼ሺߙ, ߚሻሿ ൌ ܲ஼ ∙ ܰ஼ሺߙ, ߚሻ ൅ ݑሺܵఈ , ߚሻ െ ݔ஼ 
Solving for the contribution give the Nash 
equilibrium contribution levels: 17 
 ݔு ൌ ܰ஼ሺܰுሻଶሺܰு ൅ܰ஼ሻଶ ; 		ݔ஼ ൌ ܰுሺܰ஼ሻଶሺܰு ൅ܰ஼ሻଶ 
                                                     
16 In Figure 4, it is for simplicity assumed that ܵெௌ௒ ൌ ܵொ௒. 
Time 
Stock 
Harvest 
Decision: ݐ௢ ݐ் 
Target policy: ்ܵ ்ܵ ൌ ܵ஼஼  
ܪ்݈ܿ݋ݏ݁ ݐ݋ Ͳ Time 
Stock 
Harvest 
Decision: ݐ௢ ݐ் 
Target policy: ܵ௢ ்ܵ ൌ ܵெௌ௒ 
Time
Stock 
Harvest 
Decision: ݐ௢ ݐ் 
Target policy: ܪ௢ 
 
Time 
Stock 
Harvest 
Decision: ݐ௢ ݐ் 
Target policy: ܪ௢ 
Environmental Economics, Volume 8, Issue 3, 2017 
 98
Inserting into ݌஼ ൌ ݔ஼/ሺݔு ൅ ݔ஼ሻ, yield the 
equilibrium probability of conservation solely as a 
function of the net benefits of winning the contest:  ݌ுሺߙ, ߚሻ ൌ ܰுሺߙ, ߚሻܰுሺߙ, ߚሻ ൅ ܰ஼ሺߙ, ߚሻ ; 			݌஼ሺߙ, ߚሻ ൌ ܰ஼ሺߙ, ߚሻܰுሺߙ, ߚሻ ൅ ܰ஼ሺߙ, ߚሻ 
From the equilibrium strategies, it is straightforward 
to determine how changes in the relative gains of 
the contenders for winning the contest influence the 
probabilities of winning the contest: డ௣಴డேಹ ൌ ே಴ሺேಹାே಴ሻమ ൏ Ͳ and డ௣಴డே಴ ൌ ேಹሺேಹାே಴ሻమ ൐ Ͳ  
and  
డ௣ಹడேಹ ൐ Ͳ and డ௣ಹడேಹ ൐ Ͳ. 
Note that ఈܰு ൐ Ͳ, ఉܰு ൐ Ͳ, ఉܰ஼ ൐ Ͳ and ఈܰ஼ ൐ Ͳ17. 
18E.g., look at ఉܰ஼ . Since a larger ߚ implies 
demanding a larger stock by reducing harvest, for a 
fixed preferred harvest level of the harvester, the 
implication is that the larger the ߚ level the larger 
the net gain from winning the contest for the 
conservationalists, implying ఉܰு ൐ Ͳ. The benefit 
from winning is unaffected, but the benefit from 
losing is now smaller for the harvester.  
3. The effect of extreme position on the 
probability of conserving the resource 
One of the main research questions this paper is set 
out to address is the consequence more extreme 
positioned harvesters or conservationalists has on 
the likelihood of wining the contest.  
It follows from the definition of ܲ஼  that: 
ఛܲ஼ ൌ ఛܰ஼ሺܰ஼ ൅ ܰுሻ െ ܰ஼ሺ ఛܰ஼ ൅ ఛܰுሻሺܰ஼ ൅ܰுሻଶ ൌൌ ఛܰ஼ܰு െ ఛܰுܰ஼ሺܰ஼ ൅ܰுሻଶ , ߬ ൌ ሼߙ, ߚሽ 
Therefore, ݏ݅݃݊ሼ ఛܲ஼ሽ ൌ ݏ݅݃݊ሼ ఛܰ஼ܰு െ ఛܰுܰ஼ሽ ൌݏ݅݃݊ሼேഓ಴ே಴ െ ேഓಹேಹሽ. Thereby, ఛܲ஼ ൐ Ͳ if ேഓ಴ே಴ ൐ ேഓಹேಹ. This 
directly leads to the first result: 
Result 1. Changes in ߙ and ߚ affect the probability 
of conserving the resource as follows:  
a) ఉܲ஼ ൐ Ͳ if ேഁ಴ே಴ ൐ ேഁಹேಹ,b) ఉܲ஼ ൏ Ͳ if ேഁ಴ே಴ ൏ ேഁಹேಹ, 
                                                     
17	 ఈܰு ൌ ߨு݄ఈఈ ൅ ߨఈ െ ൣߨு݄ఈఉ ൅ ߨఈ൧ ൌ ߨு݄ఈఈ ൐ Ͳ, ఉܰு ൌ ߨு݄ఉఈ െߨு݄ఉఉ ൌ െߨு݄ఉఉ ൐ Ͳ,  
ఉܰ஼ ൌ ݑௌ ఉܵఉ ൅ ݑௌ െ ൣݑௌ݄ఉఈ ൅ ݑௌ൧ ൌ ݑௌ ఉܵఉ ൐ Ͳ, ఈܰ஼ ൌ ݑௌܵఈఉ െ ݑௌܵఈఈ ൌെݑௌܵఈఈ ൐ Ͳ, Here, ఉܵఈ ൌ ݄ఈఉ ൌ Ͳ is used. 
b) ఈܲ஼ ൐ Ͳ if ேഀ಴ே಴ ൐ ேഀಹேಹ, d) ఈܲ஼ ൏ Ͳ if ேഀ಴ே಴ ൏ ேഀಹேಹ. 
The interpretation of the result is that an increase in 
either ߙ and ߚ will increase the probability that the 
resource will be conserved, if (and only if) this 
change implies a larger percentage increase in the 
net benefit from wining the contest to the 
conservationalists than to the harvester. Stated 
differently, the group that has the highest advantage 
of a more extreme position also has a larger 
probability of winning the contest.  
One interesting implication of this result is a 
situation where a conservation group moves in a 
more aggressive position. Moreover, considering the 
case where the harvesters experience large losses 
from not winning the contest. As a consequence, the 
conservation demands a larger conservation effort, 
implying larger reduction in current harvest level, 
this may result in a smaller probability that the 
resource actually will be conserved18.19 
This may imply a large cost to fishermen if they lose – 
e.g., closing their businesses – and consequently, 
they will invest large resource in lobbying to win 
the contest.    
How will the introduction of worsening 
environmental conditions affect the result from 
section 3? In order to analyze this, let us introduce 
an environmental index, ܫ ൒ Ͳ where ܫ ൌ Ͳ defines 
the initial environmental conditions, while ܫ ൐ Ͳ 
implies a worsening environmental condition in the 
following sense: ܵுூ ൏ Ͳ. This implies that under 
worsening of environmental conditions, a unit more 
harvest reduces the stock more. The idea is that 
when ܫ increases, for a given harvesting rule, the 
resulting stock will be reduced. On the other hand, 
we let ܵூ ൌ Ͳ, such that the effect of worsening 
environmental conditions only works through 
harvest decision and not directly through the stock. 
How will worsening of environmental conditions 
affect the probability of conservation? Here the 
result on conserving the resource can be derived as:  
ூܲ஼ ൌ ூܰ஼ܰு െ ூܰுܰ஼ሺܰ஼ ൅ ܰுሻଶ  ݏ݅݃݊൛ ூܲ஼ൟ ൌ ݏ݅݃݊ሼ ூܰ஼ܰு െ ூܰுܰ஼ሽ 
Result 2. The worsening of environmental 
conditions leads to a smaller probability of 
conservation, if:  
                                                     
18As an example, in 2006, WWF demanded the full closure of the cod 
fisheries in Baltic Sea: ”A necessary step to recovery is a closure of the 
cod fishery in the eastern Baltic until the stock can be documented as 
being outside the high risk zone and has entered the overfishing square” 
quote page 18 (WWF, 2006). 
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ூܰ஼ܰ஼ ൏ ூܰுܰு 	. 
This result seems striking in the sense that when the 
stock is under more stress that it cannot be 
guaranteed that it is more likely that the stock gets 
conserved. 
To go one step deeper into this result, note that:  ூܰ஼ ൌ ݑௌሺ ூܵఉ െ ܵூఈሻ,ூܰு ൌ ߨ௛ሺ݄ூఈ െ ݄ூఉሻ.
Result 2 can be re-written as: ூܲ஼ ൏ Ͳ if ௨ೄሺௌ಺ഁିௌ಺ഀሻே಴ ൏గ೓ሺ௛಺ഀି௛಺ഁሻேಹ . Hence, it is more likely that ூܲ஼ ൏ Ͳ the 
larger ߨ௛ compared to ݑௌ, which implies that the 
harvesters profit is more sensitive to changes in 
harvest than the conservationalists’ utility with 
respect to changes in the stock. This could be the 
case when, e.g., fishers are very dependent on the 
income from fishery. In such a situation, fishermen 
will have a large loss if they do not win the contest, 
since now the implied harvest level is reduced due 
to worsening environmental conditions. They will 
therefore invest more in winning the contest, and 
making it less likely that the resource is conserved. 
Look at an example, and consider that ߙ ൌ ͳ (or 
close to 1). In this case, ݄ூఈ ൌ Ͳ, as the harvesters do 
not all all care about the future when ߙ ൌ ͳ. 
Moreover, for any ߚ, it also follows that ூܵఉ ൌ Ͳ,
since the choice of ܵ is unaffected by changes in ܫ. 
Therefore:  
ூܰ஼ ൌ ݑௌ ቀ ூܵఉ െ ܵூఈቁ ൌ െݑௌ ூܵఈ ൐ Ͳூܰு ൌ ߨ௛ ቀ݄ூఈ െ ݄ூఉቁ ൌ െߨ௛݄ூఉ ൐ Ͳ
Note first that ݄ூఉ and ܵூఈ are somehow correlated,
since ݄ூఉ measures the reduction in harvest for a 
given ܵ when ܫ goes up, while ܵூఈ measures the 
reduction in stock for given harvest as ܫ increases.  
Now consider that profits are low (e.g., due to open 
access for a long time), and the harvesters are now 
being in a financial downturn. If they lose the 
contest, some or all of them might very well go 
bankrupt. Therefore, ߨ௛ is large and the net gain 
from wining large. This would imply that the 
harvesters will willing to invest much to win and 
consequence, the probability of conservation the 
resource will smaller (potentially ending in a 
situation where both the fishery and the stock will 
collapse).  
This is, however, not the full story. It the stock is 
decreasing, and potentially to a critical level (where 
recovery is problematic, and or collapse is a 
possibility), ݑௌ also tends to be high and the net 
benefit from winning the contest also is large for the 
conservationalist. This has then an offsetting effect 
on the probability that the stock will not be 
conserved due to the increased pressure from the 
harvesters.  
From a policy point of view, and given the political 
contest model, a way to increase the likelihood of 
conservation in this particular case will be to 
support harvester, such that in case of losing the 
contest, the cost of losing not so severe. This could 
be policies as providing fishers with outside options 
or even subsidies. These normally doomed 
inefficient measures, but in this case, they help 
conserve the stock by reducing the loss for the 
fishermen from not winning the contest, and thereby 
reducing their lobby effort.  
One way of introducing asymmetry into the model 
is by introducing a cost parameter ߛ ൐ ͳ. Now the 
welfare functions for the two contenders are given 
by:   ܧሾܹுሺߙ, ߚሻሿ ൌ ܲு ∙ ߨሺ݄ఈ , ߙሻ ൅ ܲ஼ ∙ ߨ൫݄ఉ , ߙ൯ െ ߛ∙ ݔுܧሾܹ஼ሺߙ, ߚሻሿ ൌ ܲ஼ ∙ ݑ൫ܵఉ , ߚ൯ ൅ ܲு ∙ ݑሺܵఈ , ߚሻ െ ݔ஼  
From this, it is possible to derive the new 
equilibrium contribution levels as: ݔ஼ ൌ ܰு ∙ ߛ ∙ ሺܰ஼ሻଶሺܰு ൅ ߛ ∙ ܰ஼ሻଶ , ݔு ൌ ܰ஼ሺܰுሻଶሺܰு ൅ ߛ ∙ ܰ஼ሻଶ	. 
Inserting these into the expression of ܲ஼ yields the 
probability of conservation in equilibrium as a 
function of ߛ: ܲ஼ ൌ ݔ஼ݔு ൅ ݔ஼ ൌ ߛ ∙ ܰ஼ߛ ∙ ܰ஼ ൅ܰு 
Now, it is possible to derive how the cost parameter 
affects the probability of conservation:  
ఊܲ஼ ൌ ܰ஼ሺߛ ∙ ܰ஼ ൅ ܰுሻ െ ܰ஼ߛ ∙ ܰ஼ሺߛ ∙ ܰ஼ ൅ ܰுሻଶ ൌൌ ܰுሺߛ ∙ ܰ஼ ൅ ܰுሻଶ ൐ Ͳ 
As long as ߛ ൐ ͳ, it makes sense that ఊܲ஼ ൐ Ͳ. The 
interpretation of an increase in ߛ in this contest 
could be that conservation issues achieve more 
support, either from more focus from the public 
and/or more support in the political area, moving up 
the conservation issue in the political arena. As a 
Environmental Economics, Volume 8, Issue 3, 2017 
 100
consequence, it is becoming continuously more 
difficult for the harvester to influence the decision 
makers. More precisely, it is becoming more costly 
for the harvesters to influence the probability of 
wining the contest. Therefore, by the logic of the 
contest model, the harvester will invest less into the 
contest. This can be seen from the expressions of ݔு 
and ݔ஼ , where it follows that ௫಴௫ಹ increases with 
increasing ߛ. 
Discussion and conclusion 
All results in this paper are based on the simple, but 
strong logic of the political contest model that the 
group that has the relatively largest increase in the 
net benefit from wining the contest also will 
increase its probability of wining the contest. Even 
without specifying any lobby technology, by which 
lobby effort translates into policy influence, many 
authors argue that the policy contest model 
summarizes a fundamental driver of lobbying and 
its effect on the policy outcome. The more is at 
stake for the lobby group the more will this group 
invest into the policy process to gain policy 
advantages. Therefore, whether a more extreme 
conservation or more extreme harvesting group wins 
the contest depends on the relative change in net 
benefit.  
The analysis is based on a number of assumptions. 
It is therefore appropriate to discuss their 
justification. 
The analysis has exclusively focused on the 
probability of conservation or the resource. Note 
that, e.g., in the case where a more extreme 
conservation group implies a smaller probability of 
conservation, the expected (ex ante) stock could 
very well be larger. The reason being that we less 
often see the resource being conserved, but when it 
does, then the conservation is more extensive since 
the expected size of the stock then depends on the 
change in the size of the conservation and of the 
probability of conservation. However, restricting 
attention to ܲ஼ , still is important for a number of 
reasons. If, e.g., the resource is under pressure (in 
particular if a harvest group with large ߙ is the 
opponent), then losing the contest can imply a 
collapse of the resource, and in this case, a more 
extreme conservation group might therefore 
increase the probability of a collapse of the resource 
(given the condition from result 1a). 
Often policies (like the catch level for a given 
fishery) are found to be on a continuous line (even 
though some focal points can be identified). In our 
setting, there are only two possible outcomes (for a 
given ߙ and ߚ). However, the way the positions are 
defined, any harvest rule from an open access to a 
zero harvest is feasible. Therefore, ex post, any 
harvest level is possible. It is also possible to 
consider variations in the outcome of the political 
process for given for a given ߙ and ߚ. After all, 
there are other factors that influence the political 
decision than lobby effort. In this case, the “chosen 
policy”,  e.g., could be drawn from a pdf with mean 
equal to the position of the winner.  
Throughout ߙ and ߚ are treated endogenous, even 
though we analyzed changes the position of the 
contenders. For the conservation group, the position 
could very well be defined by some kind of 
aggregation over member preferences. Preferences 
might change either by inflows and outflows of 
members, and also, e.g., by changes in knowledge, 
awareness, and social factors. For the harvesters, the 
position to a large degree is determined by the 
discount factor hold by the group. A more extreme 
position of harvesters could occur if the economic 
conditions of the harvesters deteriorate, making the 
need for more short-sided decisions more pervasive. 
Note, given condition c) of result 1 is met, the 
probability of wining the contest might then be even 
less for the harvester. (Even though the expected 
harvest might be larger, the probability of, e.g., 
going bankrupt will increase). 
Finally, what happens if conservation is not 
successful? E.g., an interesting aspect here is 
that from the identification of an environmental 
or resource problem until regulation is in place 
and until the problem is resolve take many years 
or even decades (see Varjopuro et al., 2014). In 
this case, there are several possibilities. But in 
this model the implication is simple; the net 
benefit of the conservation group from wining 
will be lower, while the net benefit from winning 
remains unaltered, so the probability of 
conservation will fall.   
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